

**Submission of the Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network  
(AFTINET) to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on Australia's  
negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)**

**Prepared by Louise Southalan and Dr Patricia Ranald  
Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINET)  
Public Interest Advocacy Centre  
Level 1, 46-48 York St  
Sydney 2000  
Ph 02 92997833  
Fax 02 92997855  
pranald@piac.asn.au  
lsouthalan@piac.asn.au**

## **Contents**

Introduction and overview	3
---------------------------	---

### **SECTION ONE**

The consultation process	3
--------------------------	---

Australia's objectives in participating in the GATS negotiations	6
--	---

The status of public services	7
-------------------------------	---

WTO Working Parties	8
---------------------	---

### **SECTION TWO**

Education	9
-----------	---

Health	10
--------	----

Audiovisual services	11
----------------------	----

Environmental services	14
------------------------	----

Postal and courier	15
--------------------	----

Investment	16
------------	----

Recommendations	17
-----------------	----

References	18
------------	----

## **Introduction and overview**

The Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINET) welcomes the opportunity to make submissions in response to the discussion paper on the GATS produced by DFAT. AFTINET is a network of 62 churches, unions, environment groups, human rights and development groups and other community organisations as well as individuals which conducts public education and debate about trade policy. AFTINET supports the development of trading relationships with all countries and recognises the need for regulation of trade through the negotiation of international rules.

This submission is divided into two sections. The first contains general comments regarding the consultation process conducted by DFAT, Australia's objectives within the GATS negotiating process, and the implications of the negotiating process for public services in Australia. This includes a discussion of the multilateral negotiations being undertaken within WTO Working Parties on GATS rules and government regulation, as well as the bilateral request-offer process discussed in the DFAT discussion paper. The second section addresses issues arising from current and future commitments affecting particular service sectors.

Throughout the submission two broad issues are considered:

- the implications of the current commitments for public services in view of the ambiguity of Article 1.3 of GATS, and
- the implications of new requests.

## **Section One**

### **The consultation process**

- Lack of transparency in WTO processes

WTO documents make frequent reference to the need for 'transparency', but this transparency is conceived in terms of an obligation on countries towards exporters in other countries. WTO bargaining and negotiations, on the other hand, are characterised by a lack of transparency. This hinders governments of less powerful states in developing informed policy positions on trade. It is a particular obstacle for developing countries and impedes their 'capacity to evaluate the requests submitted to them by developed country trading

partners' (UNCTAD 2002 par 53) However it is also of direct relevance to Australia, as a middle power in a global trade environment dominated by the US, EU and Japan. Despite this, recent proposals by a group of developing countries to make the WTO meeting process more transparent have not been adopted.

The DFAT discussion paper presents the WTO negotiation process as one in which governments make decisions to liberalise as a self-contained process (DFAT 2003a p 6). However, the reality is that such decisions are taken as part of bargaining process in a context of great disparities in bargaining power. The lack of transparency means that the public is unable to assess whether the bargains struck are appropriate, and in fact is hardly able to ascertain what bargains have been struck at all. The small amount of information made available by governments on particular requests is presented as being unrelated to other requests and offers. There are also trade-offs with negotiations in other areas such as agriculture. This was illustrated clearly in the comments of EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in his visit to Australia last year. The Australian Financial Review reported that Mr. Lamy said that 'the EU wanted Australia to lift restrictions on foreign ownership of Telstra and the sensitive water-distribution industry in return for any concessions from Europe on barriers to agricultural trade in coming world trade talks' (Australian Financial Review 17 July 2002 pp 1,9).

The lack of transparency within the WTO process makes it difficult to participate in debates about such fundamental matters as the capacity for governments to regulate, the appropriate mix of public and private control over resources and services, and principles for the expenditure of public funds. The GATS negotiations impact significantly on all of these matters.

- Lack of transparency in the negotiation process at domestic level

The secrecy at the international level is mirrored at the Australian domestic level. The GATS negotiations are being undertaken by the federal government largely in isolation from any public debate on the issues being negotiated. Decisions to make commitments will have dramatic consequences for the public, yet the public has not been adequately informed of the proposals or their implications. The EU's act of placing details of its offer responding to bilateral requests in the public domain on 18 February 2003 indicates that there are alternatives to the Australian government's secretive approach.

Under the Australian Constitution, much of the responsibility for the regulation and delivery of services falls upon state governments, and through them is delegated to local governments. Because of this it is critical that state and local governments and agencies be well-informed and consulted about the implications of the GATS negotiations. The extent to which this has occurred so far, however, appears to be minimal, particularly for local government, as noted in resolutions passed by a number of councils and the National Local Government Association.

In this context the fact that DFAT has produced a discussion paper and sought public comment is to be welcomed. However, there are fundamental inadequacies in the information provided in the discussion paper which mean that responses to it can only be generated from a position of ignorance of critical facts. In particular, the discussion paper summarises requests made to Australia, rather than disclosing which countries have made particular requests and the detail of each request. Requests made by Australia to other countries are barely mentioned at all, making it impossible to comment meaningfully on the impact of such requests on developing countries in particular. This hinders scrutiny and debate by civil society about the operation and effects of Australia's trade policy.

The discussion paper provides no analysis of Australia's current commitments and their implications. This reflects a broader failure within the paper to acknowledge debates about the merits of the approach to liberalisation adopted under GATS. The discussion paper refers uncritically to potential economic benefits from the GATS processes without reference to costs associated with this process, both economic and non-economic (DFAT 2003a p4).

The discussion paper deals selectively with the GATS negotiation processes. As mentioned above, there is no reference within the paper to the ongoing negotiations within the WTO Working Parties on regulation and GATS rules. These are important developments which can impact significantly on Australia, yet the discussion paper proceeds on the basis that the bilateral negotiations are the only matters on which public comment need be sought. This emphasis on the bilateral negotiations tends to present the GATS requests as occurring in isolation from ongoing multilateral commitments. The obligation of WTO members to progressively higher levels of liberalisation is mentioned (at page 4 of the discussion paper),

but no comment or analysis is given as to the implications of such an obligation, which effectively narrows the policy choices of future governments.

### **Australia's objectives in participating in the GATS negotiations**

The discussion paper defines Australia's objective within the GATS process as being to gain an expansion of exports for service providers (at p 10). Also within the section dealing with Australia's objectives is a statement that the Australian government 'will not agree to any diminution of our overall right to regulate that would constrain our ability to pursue legitimate policy objectives in the regulation of services sectors, or compromise the capacity of governments to fund and maintain public services' (DFAT 2003a p 10).

Such a statement is welcome in principle, but raises more questions than it answers. What exactly is meant by the 'overall right to regulate', and does this differ from a right to regulate in particular sectors? Is it an objective of the government that public services be exempted from the GATS negotiations? Is it an objective to ensure that the capacity of all levels of government to regulate not be diminished?

The discussion paper fails to state what broader principles underpin the government's GATS negotiating position. The WTO negotiating process is one of give and take, and of trading interests against other interests. Beyond the objective of increasing export opportunities, the discussion paper gives no indication of the principles on which the GATS negotiations will be conducted by Australia. One may gain some idea of these principles from the government's recent foreign and trade policy white paper, however, which is characterised by the primacy it accords US-Australia relations in both strategic and economic spheres.

The emphasis within the discussion paper on the trade export aspects of the GATS agreement obscures the role of other public policy objectives. On a reading of the discussion paper one may ask whether the national interest is assessed purely in terms of maximising export opportunities, or whether other policy goals have importance, such as environmental sustainability, human rights, protection of marginalised groups, maintenance of Australian culture, and Australian control of Australian resources.

The discussion paper does not address the issue of how Australia's approach to the GATS negotiations fits within Australia's foreign policy objectives regarding developing countries, which is particularly striking given the effect that Australia's requests might have on these countries. Other countries have incorporated their development policies into their approach to the GATS negotiations. Canada and New Zealand, for example, both cite particular measures they have adopted within their GATS strategy to take account of the impact of GATS on least developed countries. DFAT does formulate and disseminate development policies as a function of AusAID's work. AusAID defines its objectives as 'advancing Australia's interests by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development' (AusAID 2001 p 5). It is unfortunate that the discussion paper indicates that these development goals do not appear to play any role in Australia's position on the GATS negotiations.

In this regard it is useful to note the consultation document on GATS prepared by the European Commission, in which, in addition to the goal of improving the conditions of access for EC services exporters, two other key objectives are identified:

- 'to make progressive liberalisation of trade in services not only consistent with, but also supportive of, sustainable development, while
- ensuring that WTO members can adequately protect their national policy objectives' (at p 13).

### **The status of public services**

Assurances are given in the discussion paper and have been given elsewhere that the government does not intend that public services or government's capacity to regulate these services be diminished by the GATS negotiations. If this is the case, these services should be formally exempted from the negotiations (DFAT 2003a pp 6, 10). The European Commission has stated in its draft responses to GATS that it will not make further undertakings regarding health, education and audiovisual services, in response to public concerns (European Commission 2003 p 1). As mentioned above, it has since made publicly available its offers responding to bilateral requests. As this information was released a few days prior to the date for lodgement of this submission, the submission does not contain comment on the EU offer.

It is particularly important that public services be clearly exempted in light of the ambiguity about GATS Article 1.3. This Article states that all services are covered by GATS except those supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, ie those ‘supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers’. Ambiguity arises about which services are covered by this exemption because in Australia, as in many other countries, public and private services are provided side by side. This includes education, health, water, prisons, telecommunications, energy and many more. The discussion paper asserts that public services will not be caught by GATS under this clause, and draws a distinction, by way of example, between public education services and private education services. However no argument is presented as to why these should be seen as qualitatively different under the GATS agreement. It is legitimate to ask whether, for example, there is any guarantee that public TAFE will not be subject to GATS, as it is operating in an increasingly competitive national vocational education and training market. Comments by the WTO Secretariat do not offer support for the government’s assertion, and, rather, suggest a narrow interpretation of Article 1.3 (WTO 1998a, quoted in Ellis-Jones & Hardstaff 2002 at p 25).

The likely resolution of this ambiguity will be through rulings of WTO Dispute Panels, deciding on challenges by a member state to the public service arrangements of another member state. The panels may well adopt interpretations similar to that offered by the WTO Secretariat, which would bring many services currently considered to be public services under the coverage of the GATS agreement. Other governments have taken steps to protect themselves from such an outcome through horizontal limitations. For example, the EU has made a horizontal commitment stating that ‘services considered as public utilities at a national or local level may be subject to public monopolies’. In contrast, Australia has made no such horizontal commitment, and so is dependent on an interpretation of Article 1.3 which finds that public services are not subject to the GATS unless specific commitments have been made.

In the context of such ambiguity, the government should make an explicit statement that public services are exempt from Australia’s GATS negotiations, and should decline to make further commitments in public services.



## **WTO Working Parties**

The DFAT discussion paper summarises and briefly discusses bilateral requests made to Australia. In addition to this bilateral offer and request process, however, there are several multilateral negotiations proceeding within the WTO on issues of great significance for Australia. In particular the negotiations within the WTO Working Parties on GATS rules and on domestic regulation have important implications.

The Working Party on domestic regulation was established under GATS Article VI.4 to develop ‘any necessary disciplines to ensure that measures relating to qualification, requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services’. This envisages a mechanism for determining whether government regulation should be required to be recast in other ways so as to be least trade restrictive. Such an idea seeks to fit public policy making, which involves a range of non-economic as well as economic values, within criteria that requires that particular economic criteria (the quality of being ‘least trade restrictive’) be preferred. This should be rejected by the Australian government.

The Working Party on GATS rules is discussing a proposal to apply ‘national treatment’ and ‘equal access’ rules to government funding of services. This would have the effect of defining funding of public services as ‘subsidies’, which would allow foreign corporations to argue for equal access to these funds through compulsory competitive tendering. This is discussed further below in relation to its likely effects in particular sectors.

## **Section Two**

### **Australia’s commitments and requested future commitments**

This submission does not address every sector within the GATS negotiations, but rather raises some questions and issues regarding several sectors of particular broad public policy importance. However, the concerns discussed above about the negotiation and consultation process, and about the need to exempt public services, apply to every sector within the GATS negotiations.

## **Education**

Australia's scheduled commitments in the education sector are limited. As discussed above, however, the interpretation of Article 1.3 may mean that public education is already subject to the GATS agreement. Education in Australia is provided on a commercial basis, and it is hard to argue that public education is not provided in competition with private service suppliers, such as private schools, colleges and universities.

The discussion paper states that requests have been made for full commitments in all sub-sectors of education. Acceding to such requests would allow foreign education service providers to operate with a commercial presence in Australia. The outcome of the current negotiations of the Working Party on GATS rules would be of particular relevance. If, as has been discussed in the Working Party, the definition of 'subsidy' is broadened to include government funding of services, then such foreign education service providers would be able to require the right to tender for government funding on an equal basis with government schools, universities and TAFE colleges, on the basis of the national treatment obligation under GATS.

This would lead to privatisation of public education services. Decisions about funding and provision of education services should be made democratically after public debate by elected governments, not through trade negotiations.

The implications of responding to requests for further commitments in the education sector illustrate the need to exempt public education, and all public services, from the negotiations.

## **Health**

Australia's scheduled commitments are limited to podiatry, chiropody and dental services (although dental services are listed under professional services, not under health services). Dental services have no limitations on modes 1-3. Currently public dental services are limited, but the effect of these commitments is that if governments decided to introduce public dental services in the future, foreign corporations could seek access to the public funds under the national treatment obligation.

As with education, health services are currently provided by the states on a commercial basis, and it may be argued that this is done in competition with one or more service providers. Again, the implications under GATS Article 1.3 are significant, as has been specifically noted by the WTO Secretariat: “The co-existence of private and public hospitals may raise questions, however, concerning their competitive relationship and the applicability of the GATS: in particular, can public hospitals nevertheless be deemed to fall under Article 1.3?...The hospital sector in many countries...is made up of government and privately owned entities which both operate on a commercial basis, charging the patient or his insurance for the treatment provided...It seems unrealistic in such cases to argue for continued application of Article 1.3 and/or maintain that no competitive relationship exists between the two groups of suppliers or services. In scheduled sectors, this suggests that subsidies and any similar economic benefits conferred on one group would be subject to the national treatment obligation under Article XVII” (WTO 1998b, quoted in Ellis-Jones & Hardstaff 2002 p 42) In view of the risk, if not the likelihood, of such an interpretation being adopted by a WTO Trade Dispute Panel, there is a clear need to exempt public health from the negotiations.

The impact of the National Treatment rule on public health services, particularly if the proposed re-definition of the meaning of ‘subsidy’ occurs, would presumably have an effect similar to that predicted for public education. That is, the public health system would be privatised. In a market-dominated field the poor would be particularly at risk of not being able to access health care, with the safeguards offered by a public health system being undermined. Such a scenario does not seem unrealistic when one considers that the WTO has asked members to “ensure that ongoing reforms in national health systems are mutually supportive and, wherever relevant, market-based” (Ellis-Jones & Hardstaff 2002 p 67).

The requests for full commitments on modes 1-3 should be refused, and health, as with other public services, exempted from the GATS negotiations.

## **Audiovisual services**

Australia currently has made no commitments in the audiovisual sector, and has put in place an MFN exemption for co-production arrangements. This allows Australia to treat the nationals of other member states differently from each other in the area of audiovisual co-

production. Under the GATS agreement such MFN exemptions should in principle not exceed a period of ten years, and are subject to negotiation in subsequent trade liberalising rounds (Annex on Article II exemptions, s 5). In 2004 ten years will have elapsed since Australia entered into the GATS agreement. The discussion paper makes no mention of these issues.

The Trade Minister has acknowledged that audiovisual services play an 'integral role in developing and reflecting a sense of national and cultural identity within Australia's multicultural society [and] provide opportunities for almost universal access by Australians to their own experiences and narratives' (DFAT 2001 p 1). The discussion paper states that requests have been made removal of the MFN exemption and for full commitments to National Treatment and Market Access.

Accession to these requests would impact dramatically on Australian broadcasting and the capacity to express and reflect Australian culture. Specific issues arising from such bilateral requests are discussed below, however it should be borne in mind that the in addition to the bilateral process, the negotiations taking place within the WTO Working Parties on GATS rules and government regulation have particular significance for public broadcasting in Australia.

#### Australian content and ownership

Australian regulations currently require minimum levels of Australian content in audiovisual services, including advertising. Full commitments to Market Access and National Treatment would require the removal of such regulations. Australian content rules are a vital pillar of Australia's cultural identity and diversity which ensure that Australian voices are heard and Australian stories are told, specifically in relation to music, drama, documentaries, children's programs and pre-school programs. Their removal would threaten Australian culture and the Australian film and television industry. The fact that Australia is an English-speaking country renders it particularly vulnerable to cultural and media domination by the US in particular, which already has a large share of the Australian market. The size of the US market provides US production and media agencies with economies of scale that would overwhelm Australian content if not for the protection of local content rules. The Australian government should reject any requests to change audio visual content policy.

A related impact of commitments to National Treatment and Market Access would be severe damage to the local film and television industry. The current local content regulations foster a local skills base which enables quality films and television programs to be made in Australia. The removal of these rules would not only be an attack on Australia's culture, but would also destroy a vital and growing industry.

The rapid pace of technological change in the audiovisual sector means that government needs to retain full power to regulate in order to respond to and pre-empt changes in the sector. Government regulatory capacity is particularly important in areas which are not easily reducible to economic criteria. The Disputes Panels of the WTO decide whether government regulations are contrary to WTO obligations on the basis of trade concerns, not broader social policy objectives such as the preservation of cultural identity. Social policy objectives do not always translate into measurable economic categories, and this is particularly the case with cultural and artistic areas. Accordingly, it is crucial that government retain full capacity to regulate in the audiovisual sector.

Another implication of making commitments to national treatment relates to subsidies. Currently Australian governments support the film industry through tax concessions and financial support via such bodies as the Film Finance Corporation. These are means of subsidising Australian film makers. If national treatment commitments were made it seems almost certain that these subsidies would be the subject of challenge by other countries with competing film industries, notably the US.

Australia also has specific restrictions on foreign investment in news media and television which are intended to prevent total domination of a relatively small market by global corporations. This is a legitimate public policy goal which should not be traded away in the GATS negotiations. Requests to remove Australia's horizontal commitment allowing for limits on foreign investment pose a significant threat to diversity in the media. This is discussed further below in relation to foreign investment more generally.

#### Public broadcasting

The ABC and SBS carry out important roles as Australia's public broadcasters, providing a mechanism by which a diversity of material is made freely accessible to the population. Universal access to information is important for a range of reasons, not least its importance to

the healthy functioning of democracies. Commercial media operates within a market structure, seeking ultimately to gain maximum revenue. In contrast, public broadcasting is able to operate with broader social policy goals, including fostering local and untalented artists and arts, and catering for non-mainstream audiences such as particular ethnic and language groups. Commercial and public broadcasting clearly fulfil quite distinct roles, and it should not be assumed that the role of public broadcasters could or should be filled by commercial interests.

The ambiguity that surrounds other public services under the GATS agreement also affects public broadcasting. The ABC and SBS deliver many of their services on a commercial basis and in competition with one or more private service providers. Accordingly, it seems that public broadcasting may already be considered as falling within the scope of the GATS agreement. If so, then the market access and national treatment obligations within the GATS will apply to public broadcasting services, except to the extent limited by Australia's horizontal commitments. This takes on a particular significance in view of the negotiations within the WTO Working Party on GATS rules. If 'subsidy' is defined as including support by government for public agencies like the ABC and SBS, then the national treatment obligation would allow foreign media and broadcast corporations to demand equal rights to receive such support. The effect would be to greatly weaken the public broadcasters by transferring the funding to private providers.

### **Environmental services**

The discussion paper notes that there is 'broad support for the adoption of a broader classification scheme for environmental services', but provides virtually no information on what this in fact means, and the implications of such reclassification. The proposal includes defining 'environmental services' so widely that it includes the provision of, among other things, 'water for human use'. This EU proposal has been supported by Australia (DFAT 2001b p 1). The effect would be that supply of water - a substance essential to human life, and which is in crisis globally and within Australia - would become subject to the rules of GATS, which operate on a market basis. This change is sought to be made in a global context in which 10 major water multinational corporations dominate the market and exercise great influence.

The supply of water in Australia, as elsewhere, involves the weighing of public policy objectives, including the need to ensure access to all and the need to conserve the resource. Currently in Australia a robust public debate is underway as to the appropriate and fair means of regulating water supply, particularly with the drought affecting eastern and southern Australia. A broadening of the definition of environmental services to bring water for human use within GATS would dramatically change the balance of interests in this important area without public debate as to the merits of such a change.

The consequences of making supply of water subject to GATS are that the horizontal obligations of market access and national treatment would be applied, subject to any horizontal commitment by Australia limiting its obligations to liberalise. This would seem to make it more likely that public water supply services by public utilities would be targeted by the EU or US, whose multinationals exercise such market dominance. A challenge would probably take the form of a complaint by the US or the EU that a particular mechanism by which one of the Australian states supplies water to the public operates contrary to the GATS obligations and is in fact a restriction on trade. The capacity of Australian governments to regulate in this area would be constrained by the need to avoid Dispute Panel rulings to pay compensation to affected countries.

Such important public policy issues should be democratically decided by governments after public debate, not negotiated in trade agreements. On this basis alone the government should oppose any reclassification of environmental services.

## **Postal and courier**

The discussion paper refers to a number of requests for commitments in express delivery and postal services, without giving any indication of what these requests are. It also mentions that a request has been received for full commitments for ‘a combined classification of postal and courier services’. No information is provided in the discussion paper about this proposed reclassification.

It was made clear from the leaked EU draft requests in April 2002 that the EU is targeting Australia Post under the GATS negotiations. These requests involve the opening up of the

Australian postal market to competition from foreign service providers. It seems that the requests are likely to relate to the reserved service of Australia Post, as its other services are currently subject to competition. If such requests were met, competition would be introduced for postal services relating to the standard letter. Such services might operate with commercial competitiveness in large urban areas, but remote areas rely on cross-subsidisation in order for a common postal rate to be applied for all standard letters in Australia. The important public policy goal of providing for a common postal rate across Australia is currently met through regulation and a monopoly service. Again, this should be democratically decided.

## **Investment**

The discussion paper states that requests have sought the elimination of Australia's horizontal commitments regarding investment. This would involve the abolition of the Foreign Investment Review Board, and the abolition of any requirements for minimum Australian ownership in any industries. These regulations are a means of implementing policies of controlling foreign influence in strategic industries like the media, telecommunications, airlines and banking. The Foreign Investment Review Board has the power to review foreign investment in the national interest. Its discretion is very seldom exercised, but it is a power which the Australian government should retain. If these few remaining restrictions were to be weakened, all of these industries would be vulnerable to foreign takeover. The EC's draft requests, leaked to the public in April 2002, reveal that investment restrictions for both Telstra and Qantas are targets in the GATS negotiations.

The discussion paper contains no discussion of what these requests entail and the implications of acceding to them. The government should oppose these requests.



## Recommendations

The GATS discussion paper does not disclose sufficient detail of the requests from other governments and their implications for many essential services and public services.

The government should:

- (a) Disclose full details of its specific requests to other governments,
- (b) Disclose full details of the specific requests made to it by other governments,
- (c) Disclose full details of the government's proposed responses to the requests of other governments,
- (d) Delay responding to the requests of other governments until time has been allowed for public discussion of the Australian government's proposed responses,
- (e) Take into account the above public discussion in formulating its responses to other governments' requests
- (f) Support the exclusion of all public services from the GATS, including public health services, public education services postal services and water services, and decline to make further commitments in public services
- (g) Support the exclusion of audiovisual services from the GATS,
- (h) Oppose any proposals which would remove the right of Australia to regulate levels of foreign investment in any industry,
- (i) Oppose any proposals which would open up the funding of public services to privatisation,
- (j) Oppose any reclassification of environmental services,
- (k) Oppose any proposals which would reduce the right of governments to regulate services, including the application of a 'least trade restrictive' test to regulation, and
- (l) Submit all policies on GATS to full parliamentary debate and a parliamentary vote before commitments are made.

## References

AusAID (2001) 'AusAID Strategic Plan: Improving effectiveness in a changing environment', AusAID, Canberra

DFAT (2001a) 'Australian Intervention on Negotiating Proposal on Audiovisual Services', CTS Special Session, July 2001

DFAT (2001b) Australian Negotiating Proposal for Environmental Services, presented to WTO Council for Trade in Services

DFAT (2003a) 'Discussion paper on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)', Office of Trade Negotiations, Canberra

DFAT (2003b) 'Advancing the national interest: Australia's foreign and trade policy white paper', Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra

Ellis-Jones, M and Hardstaff, P (2002) Serving (up) the nation: a guide to the UK's commitments under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, World Development Movement, London

European Commission (2003) 'WTO Services: Commission submits draft offer to Council and Parliament – public services fully defended', media release 5 February 2003, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/services/pr050203\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/services/pr050203_en.htm)

UNCTAD (2002) Trade in Services and Development Implications: Note by the Secretariat TD/B/COM.1/55, 20 December 2002

WTO (1998a) Report of meeting held on 14 October 1998, note by the Secretariat, Council for Trade in Services, WTO, 12 November 1998, S/C/M.30

WTO (1998b) Health and Social Services – Background Note by the Secretariat, Council for Trade in Services, WTO S/C/W/50